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The doctrine of de facto municipal corporations 2 is one pecul-
iar to American law, developed by our courts from the English
doctrine of de facto officers to meet the complex situations aris-
ing from time to time due to the constantly shifting bases of
our municipal organization. Briefly stated, the doctrine is that
where there is authority in law for a municipal corporation, the
organization of the people of a given territory as such a corpora-
tion under color of delegated authority, followed by an user in
good faith of the governmental powers incidental thereto, will
be recognized by the law as a municipal corporation de facto,
wherever through the failure to comply with the constitutional
or statutory requirements the corporation cannot be said to
exist de jure.
The resulting incidents of such a status are that the organiza-
tion itself and those dealing with it as a corporation cannot
attack its existence, that its acts are as valid as those of a de
jure corporation, and that the legality of its existence cannot
be inquired into collaterally, but may be challenged only by the
state itself in quo warranto proceedings. When the question
of the corporate entity of any municipality is raised, therefore,
except by the state itself, the inquiry must first be directed to
determine whether the law and the facts are sufficient to estab-
lish its de facto status. The facts as to the attempt to organize
and as to user of the franchises in good faith are usually easily
determined. No especial difficulty, moreover, can arise where the
corporation has organized itself under authority of a valid stat-
ute and has failed to acquire a de jure status through non-com-
pliance with some of the conditions prescribed as precedent
thereto, but a more serious question often must be faced where
the statute itself under which the corporation purports to organ-
ize is later declared to be unconstitutional. Mray such a statute
be regarded as giving the color of authority required by the de
facto doctrine? May it in itself constitute a creative legislative
power sufficient to give corporate vitality to the organization
that lays claims to a legal personality? This question is one
that has given great difficulty to our courts and has led to two
well defined schools of thought. While but a subordinate phase
I The term municipal corporations in this article is used generically and
includes all local corporate governmental agencies.
[935]
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of the de facto doctrine, its consideration is essential to any
clear understanding of the conflicting opinions of our courts.
The question of the existence of de facto offices or of de facto
municipal corporations has never arisen in England. With the
exception of those corporations which came into existence as by
common law, the creative source lay either in the legislation of
Parliament or the prerogative of the crown.2 The mass of fran-
chises which in the early days were denominated firm a burgi,
being grants from the king, were considered as quasi-contract-
ual and required the consent of the grantee, a requirement that
continued applicable to all incorporations by the crown.8 The
creation of municipal corporations by Parliament, however,
never required the assent of the incorporators, being founded on
the supreme legislative power asserted by that body.4 By the
Act of 1835 5 practically all the existing municipal corporations
were placed under parliamentary control, and since that date
no new corporation has been erected by the crown., From the
supremacy of Parliament it follows that any office it creates
cannot be called in question by the courts; however its creation
may violate the established constitutional principles, the courts
must recognize it and give it support. Even prior to the full
development of the modern doctrine of parliamentary suprem-
acy, the court had held that the right of any corporation to
exercise its franchises could be tested only by quo warranto
brought by the attorney-general. In Rex v. Stacey I Mansfield
and Buller arbitrarily fixed the time within which the king him-
self could bring quo warranto to six years, and stated that with-
out question in many cases the time should be further limited.'
Upon the organization of the American states under the tri-
partite theory of the written constitution, all the residuary
powers of government formerly comprehended in the preroga-
tive of the crown, if not reserved to the people, became vested
in the legislative branch.' Hence, under our system no munici-
pal corporation can exist except as created directly or indirectly
by the legislative power. All powers of local self-government
are predicated upon the legislative fiat of the state. Even the
unique municipal corporation known as the New England town
2 Incorporation by prescription was of course recognized.
S'WILcocK, ]MUNICiPAL CORPORATIONS (1827) 30.
4Ibid. 25.
5See preamble, (1882) 45 & 46 Vict. c. 50.
6 (1835) 5 & 6 Win. IV, c. 76.
71 T. R. 1 (1785).
8 Since the Municipal Corporations Act of 1832, obviously no municipal
corporation other than de jure can exist, and the act itself expressly limits
the time within which the regularity of the election of an officer can bo
tested to twelve months.
9 1 COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LImrrATIONS (8th ed. 1927) 175.
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has uniformly been held to have derived its powers by virtue
of the colonial charter or by grant of the colonial legislature,
and to have been without any inherent power of local self-govern-
ment. ° This legislative power may be exercised by the sovereign
through the state constitution, either by express creation of local
governmental agencies,"' by the indirect recognition of their
existence, or by direct validation of irregular organizations pur-
porting to act as municipal corporations. 2  Usually, however,
it has been delegated to the state legislature, but with the recent
adoption of constitutional home rule it has in many states been
largely committed to the electors of the municipal territory, to
be exercised through the complicated machinery of the popular
initiative and referendum.
Subsequent to the organization of the state governments, and
down to the middle of the nineteenth century, the state legisla-
tures were unrestricted in the exercise of their power to create
municipal corporations. This was the era of special charters
for cities and villages and any failure to follow the method of
incorporation designated by the legislature, as well as the lack
of any power attempted to be exercised by a municipal corpora-
tion, was easily remedied by a validating statute. During this
period, in many instances the courts applied the doctrine of
legislative recognition by acquiescence or by acts subsequent to
incorporation to cure the defective organization,'" a doctrine
which in these later days has given rise to the principle of estop-
pel of the state to question the validity of incorporation.
With the adoption of the constitutional amendments limiting
the power of the legislature to incorporate or amend charters
except by general act, beginning with Ohio and Indiana in 1851,
and rapidly followed by other states, 2 questions soon were raised
in the several states as to the validity of statutes classifying
municipal corporations by population or otherwise, by which
method the legislature sought to meet the diverse needs of cities
and villages without overstepping the constitutional inhibitions.
As a general rule reasonable classifications, usually based upon
:o Webster v. Harwinton, 32 Conn4 131 (1864); Newport v. Horton, 22
R. I. 196 (1900); Commonwealth v. Roxbury, 75 Mass. 451 (1857), note
by the reporter, Horace Gray, Jr., at 503.
11 The City of Denver, for example, is created by the Constitution of
Colorado.
-12 City of Guthrie v. Territory, 1 Okla. 188, 31 Pac. 190 (1892).
" Bow v. Allenstown, 34 N. H. 351 (1857); Commissioners of Bath v.
Boyd, 230 N. C. 194 (1840). See, also, State v. Leatherman, 08 Ark. 81
(1881); Comanche County v. Lewis, 133 U. S. 198, 10 Sup. Ct. 286 (1890).
'14Iowa, 1857; Kansas, 1859; Nevada, 1864; Nebraska, 1867; Arkansas,
1868; Illinois, Virginia, Tennessee, 1870; West Virginia, 1872; Pennsyl-
vania and Texas, 1873; New Jersey and Missouri, 1875; California and
Louisiana, 1879.
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population, were upheld, but frequently the temptation to enac:
special legislation led to the passing of statutes plainly repug-
nant to the constitutional limitations. In Ohio, for example,
the legislature with the occasional approval of the courts practi-
cally ignored the restrictive provisions of the constitution upon
the creation of municipalities and the amendment of their char-
ters, until in 1902 the supreme court in State v. Jones '1 and
State v. Beacon, 6 overruling its previous decisions, held that the
existing classification of cities for purposes of legislation was
inhibited by the constitution. Under the statutes as they oper-
ated at this time, each of the eleven principal cities fell into a
separate class. So serious was the effect of the decision in the
second case affecting the continuity of the government of Cleve-
land that the execution of the judgment of ouster was suspended
by the c6urt for three months to enable the legislature and the
city of Cleveland to conform to the requirements of the decision.
In State v. Beacom, as in numerous other cases, the court was
directly driven to one of two alternatives as to the erstwhile
status of the city and the validity of the official acts pending its
operation under unconstitutional statutes,-either to hold the
state estopped to contest the validity of the statutes in question
because of its long acquiescence, or to hold that the city had
been acting as a de facto corporation, whose acts were not sub-
ject to collateral attack and whose status could only be chal-
lenged at the instance of the state itself. This latter alternative
was adopted, the court finding itself justified by the principle
established in State v. Gardner, eight years previously."7
The inclusion of restrictive limitations upon the creation of
municipal- corporations in the state constitutions, the multipli-
cation of quasi-municipal agencies, the adoption of home-rule
amendments with uncertain provisions governing their exercise
by the local electorate, have all within more recent years given
rise to innumerable attacks upon the validity of municipal or-
ganizations. 8 Despite the efforts in many instances to forestall
the issue by general validating acts, either constitutional or
legislative, 9 the great burden of working out the resulting prob-
lems was thrown upon the courts. Their reception and assim-
ilation of new political theories to existing legal precedents
constitute a notable contribution to constructive legislation. To
L 66 Ohio St. 453, 64 N. E. 424 (1902).
16 66 Ohio St. 491, 64 N. E. 427 (1902).
'1 54 Ohio St. 24, 42 N. E. 999 (1896).
is The number of cases in which this issue is involved may be better
appreciated when we recall that every annexation of territory is in effect
pro tanto a new incorporation.
19 As examples of general validating acts, see Wis. Laws 1883, c. 54;
Laws 1897, c. 5; Minn. Laws 1897, c. 3; Ark. Acts 1909, p. 510, Acts 1915,
p. 831.
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understand how this problem was worked out, it seems best to
review the earlier cases bearing on this question.
Down to 1876 the question of a de facto corporation under
an unconstitutional statute had not been raised. Of course, there
were instances in which the question of the legality of corporate
existence was involved, but these were easily taken care of by
retrospective validation by statute or by the application of the
doctrine of incorporation by legislative recognition or that of
the estoppel of the state to question the validity of organizations
based upon acquiescence or indirect validation. A brief review
of the leading cases arising during this period may be instructive
on this point. As early as 1840, in Commissioners v. Eoyd,-0
the Supreme Court of North Carolina had held that the inhabi-
tants of Bath had been incorporated in 1729 by a legislative
grant to them of certain lands for the purpose of a common.
In Jameson v. People,21 an action of quo -warranto in the name of
the people of the state, the courts of Illinois held that the state
was estopped to question the validity of the incorporation of the
town of Oquawka in 1851 on the ground that the legislature
by statutes enacted in 1852 and 1855 had authorized the town to
subscribe to the capital stock of certain corporations therein
named and thereby recognized its corporate existence. In 1857
the Supreme Judicial Court of New Hampshire, in Bow v. Al-
lenstown,; decided that the incorporation of a town could be
established by, proof of claim and user of corporate powers by
the town with the knowledge and assent of the legislature for
a period sufficient to furnish evidence of a prescriptive right.
The exercise of the courts of equitable jurisdiction was occa-
sionally invoked, and its limitations were soon realized. Thus,
in 1841, the Supreme Court of Tennessee, in Bradley v. Comrmis-
sioners,23 upheld an injunction against the organization of the
county of Powell under authority of an act of the legislature
of 1839. The bill was filed in January 1840, before the organ-
ization was perfected, at least before there was any user of the
franchises, and alleged that the act of the legislature was un-
constitutional, violating the limitation established by the Con-
stitution as to area, location and population. In 1848, in the
case of Ford v. Farner,2 a bill in chancery to enjoin and vacate
the county of Hancock, which had been organized under a legis-
lative act of 1844, the court refused to grant the injunction upon
the grounds that the power to organize had been executed and,
even though the statute was unconstitutional, the county under
20Supra note 13.
2116 ll. 257 (1855).
2234 N. H. 351 (1857).
23 2 Humph. 428 (Tenn. 1841).
24 9 Humph. 152 (Tenn. 1848).
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it had become a political corporation of the state; and that the
court of chancery was without power to inquire into the validity
of the act.
In 1859 the New York Court of Appeals decided the important
case of Rumsey v. People.25 The case involved criminal juris-
diction and the constitutionality of a statute of 1854 erecting
the county of Schuyler, which was attacked upon the ground
that the new county did not contain the population required by
the Constitution. The court by a vote of five to three upheld
the constitutionality of the statute upon the ground that the
determination of the fact by the state legislature was beyond
judicial control. Johnson, C. J., and Denio, J., in concurring
with the majority opinion of Strong, J., delivered oral opinions
suggesting that the basis of the decision should be that both
branches of the legislature and the executive department of the
government had recognized the existence of the county by subse-
quent acts and thereby put a practical construction on the whole
subject. which precluded an inquiry by the judiciary. In Lan-
ning v. Carpenter,2 6 decided by the same court in 1859, in whicb
the existence of the county of Schuyler was again brought in
question in connection with a motion to set aside an execution
delivered to the sheriff of the so-called county, the court held
that its organization was unconstitutional prior to the year 1857,
the date of the legislative acts upon which Johnson and Denio,
J. J., had upheld its validity.
In 1867 the Supreme Court of Michigan decided the case of
People v. Maynard, 2 7 a quo warranto proceeding against the act-
ing sheriff of Marquette County. This case involved the organ-
ization of the town of Teal Lake, which was attacked upon the
ground that a statute of 1857 authorizing its creation did not
conform to the constitutional provision as to the enacting clause.
The court, speaking through Campbell, J., said:
"If this question had been raised immediately, we are not
prepared to say that it would have been altogether free from
difficulty. But, inasmuch as the arrangement there indicated
had been acted upon for ten years before the recent legislation,
and had been recognized as valid by all parties interested, it
cannot now be disturbed. Even in private associations, the acts of
parties interested may often estop them from relying on legal
objections, which might have availed them if not waived. But
in public affairs, where the people have organized themselves
under color of law into the ordinary municipal bodies, and have
gone on year after year raising taxes, making improvements,
and exercising their usual franchises, their rights are properly
regarded as depending quite as much on the acquiescence as on
2519 N. Y. 41 (1859).
26 20 N. Y. 447 (1859).
2715 Mich. 463 (1867).
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the regularity of their origin, and no e. post facto inquiry can
be permitted to undo their corporate existence. Whatever may
be the rights of individuals before such general acquiescence,
the corporate standing of the community can be no longer open
to question. See Rumsey v. People, 19 N. Y. 41, and Lamning V.
Ca rpenter, 20 N. Y. 447; where the effect of the invalidity of
an original county organization is very well considered in its
public and private bearings. There have been direct legislative
recognitions of the new division on several occasions. Laws,
1858, p. 23; Laws, 1861, p. 556; Laws, 1863, p. 22. The exercise
of jurisdiction being notorious and open in all such cases, the
state as well as county and town taxes being all levied under it,
there is no principle which could justify any court at this late
day in going back to inquire into the regularity of the law of
1857."
In State v. County of Pawnee 28 quo warranto was brought by
the attorney general against the board of county commissioners,
claiming that the county, which was established in 1868, had no
valid organization on account of fraud and irregularities in its
organization. The court upheld the validity of the organization
and the authority of the commissioners to exercise the duties of
their office upon the ground that by later acts the legislature
had recognized the existence of the county and such recognition
had cured any fraudulent or defective organization, thus apply-
ing the broad doctrine of indirect validation by legislative recog-
nition. At the same term of court, in the case of State v. County
of Ford -9 it was held that the state was not estopped to contest
the validity of the organization of the county in 1873, notvith-
standing legislative recognition by an act prior to the organiza-
tion of the county de facto.
During this period the direct issue of questions involving de
facto or de jure status was mainly avoided by the free applica-
tion of the doctrine that no one but the state in any instance
could question the regularity of the incorporation, a doctrine
that proved very convenient in summarily disposing of numerous
cases. Thus, in Kayser v. Trustees of Brcmen,30 the Supreme
Court of Missouri, although holding that the statute authorizing
an optional organization of towns was constitutional, placed its
position in refusing to uphold an injunction to restrain the local
officers from collecting certain taxes upon the broad doctrine
that the authority of the town to act was not subject to collat-
eral attack. Similar decisions in the same and other jurisdic-
tions applied this principle31 The doctrine of collateral attack
2812 Kan. 426 (1874).
2912 Kan. 441 (1874).
30 16 Mo. 88 (1852).
31 State v. Rich, 20 Mo. 393 (1855) (criminal case); Mendota v. Thomp-
son, 20 Ill. 197 (1858) (same); Town of Decorah v. Gillis, 10 Iowa 234
(1859) (same); Lusher v. Scites, 4 W. Va. 11 (1870) (tax case); McNairy
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was indiscriminately invoked and often confused with that of
equitable estoppel, under which the corporation itself or any one
who had dealt with it as a corporation is precluded from ques-
tioning the de jure character of its existence.32 Only in occa-
sional instances was the application of the doctrine of collateral
attack or that of equitable estoppel made to depend on a consid-
eration of the de facto character of the corporation. It was
held, however, in a few of the early cases, that the plea of nul
tiel corporation raised only the issue of its de facto status, and
the principle was broadly laid down that the requisites of a de
facto corporation were a valid law, an organization in attempted
compliance therewith and an user of the corporate franchises"'
That a valid law was essential to the de facto status, so as to
preclude collateral attack, was tacitly admitted in many cases and
expressly held in others.3 4
The question whether a de facto corporation could exist under
an unconstitutional statute was met in some of the early cases
by the assumption that the determination of the factual require-
ments prescribed by the state constitution for the incorporation
of municipalities was solely within the province of the legisla-
ture and not subject to judicial review."5 It was not until 1876
that the question of an unconstitutional statute as color of au-
thority sufficient to meet the requirement of a valid law was
frankly confronted. In that year, in St. Louis v. Shields,"' a
case in which the defendant pleaded that the statute under which
the plaintiff was organized was void as conflicting with the con-
stitutional provision against special legislation, the Supreme
Court of Missouri laid down the principle that, for all collateral
v. Nashville, 2 Baxter 251 (Tenn. 1872) (same); Bird v. Perkins, 33 Mich.
28 (1875) (same); Stuart v. School District, 30 Mich. 69 (1874) (same);
Rice v. McClelland, 58 Mo. 116 (1874) (allocation of school funds) ; Trumbo
v. People, 75 Ill. 562 (1874) (contract case) ; St. Louis v. Shields, 62 Mo.
247 (1876) (same); Alderman v. School Directors, 91 Ill. 179 (1878) (tres.
pass case).
"2Dutchess Cotton Mfg. Co. v. Davis, 14 Johns. 238 (N. Y. 1817); Don
v. Van Houten, 10 N. J. L. 270 (1829); Eaton v. Aspinwall, 19 N. Y. 119
(1859); Mason v. Nichols, 22 Wis. 376 (1867).
33 Methodist Church v. Pickett, 19 N. Y. 482 (1859); Merriman v. Ma-
giveny, 12 Heisk. 494 (Tenn. 1873).
34 Elizabeth City Academy v. Lindsey, 28 N. C. 476 (1846); Heaston v.
Cincinnati F. & W. R. R., 16 Ind. 275 (1861): Snyder v. Studebaker, 19
Ind. 462 (1862); De Witt v. Hastings, 40 N. Y. Super. Ct. 463 (1876);
Krutz v. Paola Town Co., 20 Kan. 397 (1878).
35 State v. Rich, supra note 31; Lusher v. Scites, supra note 31; State v.
Dorsey, 28 Ark. 378 (1873).
These decisions were based upon Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1 (U. S.
1849),, in which the Supreme Court refused to go back of the determina-
tion of the legislature of Rhode Island as to the legitimacy of the state
government.
36 Supra note 31.
DE FACTO MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
purposes, a statute though unconstitutional was color of au-
thority sufficient for a de facto organization.
Five years prior to the decision in St. Louis v. Shields the
Supreme Court of Connecticut, in State v. Carroll,3' a case in-
volving the validity of acts of a person acting as a justice of the
peace who had discharged the duties of the office without author-
ity of the appointing power, undertook to review the historical
and legal basis of the de facto doctrine applied to officers. In
a monographic opinion, Chief Justice Butler reviewed the Eng-
lish cases and set forth the foundation and limits of this doctrine.
As the application of the de facto doctrine to the acts of public
agencies acting as municipal corporations has its historical basis
in the early recognition of the official validity of acts of in-
cumbents of offices whose title thereto was defective but whose
tenure had been recognized by the public, it may be well to refer
briefly to the English doctrine as developed to meet the needs of
their situation.
The first reported case in which the act of a de facto officer
was upheld is that of The Abbg de Fountahze 33 in 1431. Thirty
years later, upon the accession of Edward the Fourth, Parlia-
ment passed a statute confirming all the official acts of the kings
of the House of Lancaster who were therein recognized as "late
kings of England in deed and not of right. '" In the less than a
score of reported cases down to the beginning of the nineteenth
century, we find the limitations of the doctrine broadly set forth
in the definition of Lord Ellenborough in Rex v. Bedford Level
Corporation,40 in which he said that an officer de facto is one
"who has the reputation of being the officer he assumes to be,
and yet is not a good officer in point of law." In these early
cases are to be noted two primary limitations of the doctrine
which should always be borne in mind. The first is that there
can be no de facto officer if there is a de jure officer in possession
of the office, nor can one gain the de facto status by ousting a
de jure officer-such a claimant is a mere usurper whose title
and acts are void.41 Secondly, in order to constitute one an
338 Conn. 449 (1871).,
38 Y. B. 9 Hen. VI, f. 32. A full statement of this case may be found in
Justice Butler's opinion in State v. Carroll, supra, note 37, at 458, and in
CONSTANTINEAU, PUBLIC OFFICERS AND THE DE FACTO DocTRNE (1910)
9-10. Both of these authorities also give a list of the early cases.
39 1 BL. COMM:. *204.
40 6 East 356, 368 (1805). Ellenborough's definition closely follows that
given by Lord Holt in Parker v. Kett, 12 Mlod. 466 (1701): "A steward
de facto is none other than he who has the reputation of being the officer
he assumes to be, although he is not such in point of law." This broad
definition has been universally followed in England and generally approved
by the American courts. Petersilea v. Stone, 119 Mlass. 465 (1876).
41 The Abb6 de Fountaine, =pra note 38; McCraw v. Williams, 33 Gratt.
510 (Va. 1880).
YALE LAW JOURNAL
officer-de facto, his entry must be under color of authority and
in good faith.4 2
Chief Justice Butler, in his opinion in State v. Carroll upon a
view of the English authorities, establishes the further point
that the notion that "that color can only be conferred by a body
or person having power, or prima facie power, to elect or ap-
point in the particular case" had up to that time no foundation
in the decisions of the English courts. He also found that the
majority of the American decisions down to 1870 were in ac-
cord with the English precedents,43 and that the early New York
doctrine to the contrary was based upon a misconception of the
grounds of Chancellor Kent's decision in People v. Collins,44 as
elaborated by the reporter's note to MeInstry v. Tanner,45 and
had crept into the definition of a de facto officer through the
misrepresentation of the decision in Rex v. Lisle as reported by
Strange."6 The introduction of the same error into the definition
of a de facto officer by Chief Justice Hosmer in McCall v. Byram
Mfg. Co.47 was criticised and the distinction made in Brown v.
O'Connell18 between unconstitutional statutes apparently valid
and those manifestly repugnant to the constitution as bearing
upon color of authority was repudiated.
As a result of this review of the authorities, Justice Butler
formulated the following definition of a de facto officer as em-
bodying a restatement of the earlier decisions: 411
"An officer de facto is one whose acts, though not those of a
lawful officer, the law, upon principles of policy and justice, will
hold valid so far as they involve the interests of the public and
third persons, where the duties of the officer are exercised,
First, without a known appointment or election, but under
such circumstances of reputation or acquiescence as were calcu-
lated to induce people, without inquiry, to submit to or invoke
his action, supposing him to be either the officer he assumed to
be.
Second, under color of a known and valid appointment or elec-
tion, but where the officer had failed to conform to some prece-
dent requirement or condition, as to take an oath, give a bond, or
the like.
42 Rex v. Lisle, Andr. 163 (1738).
- Fowler v. Bebee, 9 Mass. 231 (1812); Parker v. Baker, 8 Paige 428
(N. Y. 1840); Taylor v. Skrine, 3 Brevard 516 (S. C. 1815); Carlton v.
People, 10 Mich. 250 (1862); People v. Kane, 23 Wend. 414 (N. Y. 1840);
People v. White, 24 Wend. 520 (N. Y. 1840); Clark v. Commonwealth, 29
Pa. 129 (1858); Commonwealth v. McCombs, 56 Pa. 436 (1867); Cocko v.
Halsey, 16 Pet. 71 (U. S. 1842).
447 Johns. 549 (N. Y. 1811).
45 9 Johns. 135 (N. Y. 1812).
46 2 Strange 1090 (1738).
47 6 Conn. 428 (1827).
48 36 Conn. 432 (1870).
484 Supra note 37, at 471.
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Third, under color of a known election or. appointment, void
because the officer was not eligible, or because there was a want
of power in the electing or appointing body, or by reason of
some defect or irregularity in its exercise, such ineligibility, want
of power, or defect being unknown to the public.
Fourth, under color of an election or appointment by or pur-
suant to a public unconstitutional law, before the same is ad-judged to be such."
While the question whether there could exist a de facto office
was not directly involved in State v. Carroll, the affirmative of
this proposition was distinctly asserted under the fourth subdi-
vision of Justice Butler's definition. This proposition was un-
challenged until the decision of the Supreme Court in the well
known case of Nor'tan v. Shelby Coit y,49 in which, through
Justice Field, the court said without qualification:
"An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it
imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it
is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never
been passed."
It thus repudiated in its entirety the fourth subdivision of
Justice Butler's definition so far as the creation of an office itself
was involved.
That this sweeping assertion, although adopted as the rvtio
decidendi of the case, was not necessary to the decision, may be
seen by a brief reference to the facts. The constitution of Ten-
nessee established in each county but one county court composed
of the justices chosen from their respective districts. By a
statute enacted in 1867, the governor was given authority to ap-
point commissioners for Shelby County, who were to exercise
the powers given to the board created by the constitution. The
validity of the act of these commissioners in issuing bonds was
raised by the litigation., The court failed to answer the argu-
ment of Mr. Choate that the conmissioners appointed by the
governor were only exercising powers clearly conferred upon
the county, which itself had a constitutional existence. The case
was correctly decided, however, for there can be no officers de
facto where there are officers de jure who immediately contested
their ouster by legal means, as in this case. But from the point
of view of Justice Fields, the decision might fairly have rested
upon the point that the office itself was without color of validity,
since its attempted creation was so palpably contrary to the ex-
press provisions of the constitution. We may conclude, there-
fore, that the de facto doctrine as applied to the creation of
offices requires a modification of the language of the fourth divi-
-4 118 U. S. 425, 442, 6 Sup. Ct. 1121, 1125 (1886).
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sion of Chief Justice Butler's definition so as to read "a public
unconstitutional law not plainly invalid."
-Since the decision in Norton v. Shelby County, in practically
every case that has arisen involving the de facto status of a pub-
lic office or of a public corporation in this country, the court has
discussed Justice Field's opinion and compared it with that of
Chief Justice Butler in State v. Carroll, and not infrequently
has been led to incorporate the one or the other into its opinion
as a ready-made althority for a decision it had already reached.
It follows that a classification of the later decisions on de facto
municipal corporations can best be made with reference to the
attitude of the courts on the effect of an unconstitutional statute
as color of authority. An attempt will be made to explain the
real basis of their divergence and to formulate the principles
upon which they were decided.
The statement that there can be no de facto officer unless there
exists a de jure office has been advanced in numerous cases, both
before and subsequent to the decision in Norton v. Shelby
County. In 1907, Mr. K. R. Wallach reviewed these cases " and
demonstrated that none of them substantiated the doctrine spon-
sored by Justice Field. He pointed out that in the majority of
the cases cited to support the doctrine, a de jure office was in
existence, and that in the others the one discharging the duties
of the office had entered without the color of authority. The
only case that was necessarily decided on the contrary principle
was that of Flaucher v. Camden,1 which has since been over-
ruled by the New Jersey courts.5 2 From an analysis of the cases,
Mr. Wallach deduced the following principles as governing the
doctrine of de facto officers: 52 'A
"(1) If there is a de jure office in existence, anyone (a) who
enters on such office with color of title as to his appointment or
election, or (b) who enters, acts as officer and is recognized as
such by the public, is a de facto officer. In this class of cases the
legal existence of the office confers color of title upon anyone
who has the recognition and acquiescence of the public.
"(2) If there be no office in existence de jure, and the claim-
ant enters with no color of title, under an act of the legislature
which is on its face clearly unconstitutional, he is not a de facto
officer but a mere usurper.
"(3) If there be no de lure office, and the incumbent enters
under an unconstitutional act of the legislature, but one which is
not clearly and on its face unconstitutional, and if such incumbent
does not otherwise lack color of title, he is a de facto officer.
Acquiescence on the part of the public may, perhaps, be an addi-
tional requisite.
50 Wallack, De Facto Office (1907) 22 POL. Sci. Q. 460.
51 56 N. J. L. 244, 28 AtI. 82 (1893).
52 Lang v. Bayonne, 74 N. J. L. 455, 68 AtI. 90 (1907).
52% Op. cit. supra note 50, at 479.
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"(4) The officers of de facto municipal corporations are in a
distinct class, and so long as the state itself does not attack their
title, they are treated as de jure officers."
The first, second and fourth subdivisions of Mr. WNallach's
statement are fully sustained by the decisions relating to de facto
offices and may be applied to de facto municipal corporations as
well. As to the third subdivision, it is doubtful that it can be
unqualifiedly supported either upon legal theory or by the ad-
judicated cases. Certainly, no such broad principle can recon-
cile the conflicting decisions relating to de facto municipal cor-
porations. Admitting that an unconstitutional statute appar-
ently valid on its face may give color of authority and evince
good faith on the part of those who assume to exercise the cor-
porate franchises, it is difficult to see how, standing alone, it can
impart that creative legislative force essential to the existence
of a corporate entity. It is submitted that it is only when there
also exists a warrant in a valid statute or in the state constitu-
tion for the office or corporation whose title to a de facto exist-
ence is in question that its right to such a status, either in theory
or upon authority, can be accepted.
The existence of a de facto office based upon a de jure exist-
ence in potentia by recognition in the state constitution or in
general statutes has frequently been applied to sustain public
acts by those purporting to act as officers under an unconstitu-
tional statute or before the statute creating the office has gone
into effect. If under the constitution or by a general statute the
office is established or recognized, and authority is delegated to
an inferior legislative body to establish it by appropriate action,
the failure of such inferior body to act wll not prove fatal to
the de facto character of those who in good faith enter upon
the discharge of the duties of the office, which is said to exist in
potenta .53 For example, in Smith v. Lynch a statute of Ohio
authorized the city council to establish a board of health and
appoint the incumbents. Without appropriate action by the
board, appointments were made and the persons so selected as-
sumed to discharge the functions of the office. To the objection
that there was no office to be filled, the Supreme Court of Ohio
answered:
"We do not so understand the law. The statute (66 Ohio L.
200) creates the office. It authorizes the council to 'establish'
the board, and to fill it by appointment. True, until the council
act in the premises, it is a mere potentiality in their hands; yet
53 Brown v. O'Connell, supra note 48; Smith v. Lynch, 29 Ohio St. 261
(1876); Clark v. Easton, 146 Mass. 43, 14 N. E. 795 (1888); Demarest v.
Mayor, 147 N. Y. 203, 41 N. E. 405 (1895); Buck v. Eureka, 109 Cal.
504, 42 Pac. 243 (1895). In Buck v. Eureka, supra, the courtl reviews
most of the earlier decisions applying this doctrine.
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it is none the less an office, known to the law and provided for
by law. . It is enough that the office is one provided for
by law and that the parties have color of appointment, assume to
be and act as such officers, and that they are accepted and ac-
knowledged by the public as such to the exclusion of others.
Such was the case here. There was both the color and the fact
of office."
Peculiarly enough, the doctrine of potential existence was
never expressly relied upon in the earlier cases involving de
facto corporate status, although there is ground for the assertion
that the reason for the decision in People v. Maynard was drawn
from the implications of the constitution in regard to the forma-
tion of counties. In Ashley v. Board of Supervisors of Presque
Isle County," decided by the Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Cir-
cuit, in 1893, the court, although basing its decision on other
grounds, went into the discussion of the de facto status of the
county, which had been organized under an unconstitutional
statute. While expressing its approval of Justice Butler's con-
clusions in State v. Carroll, the opinion of the court frankly
bases the color of authority for the de facto status of the county
upon the doctrine of potential existence. Upon this point the
court says: 54%
"But counsel for the defendant lays principal stress upon
the doctrine that there cannot be a county de facto where there
can be none de jure; and, it is argued because the law of 1871
was void when enacted, and gave no authority for organization,
there was no law under which Presque Isle County could be-
come de jure a county, and therefore it could not become de facto
such. The general proposition is no doubt correct, as a state-
ment of a doctrine of law. But we do not think that proposition,
as applied to the case before us, is sound. . . . The supreme
law of the state recognizes counties as political bodies corporate.
Their existence is not only permitted, but is essential to the gov-
ernment which is organized. Their corporate character is not
given by the legislature. That body, if it deems the organization
consistent with public policy, prescribes a method of organiza-
tion in form. This law, whether operative or not, signified the
approval of the legislature of the formation of the new county,
and in so far was in execution of its authority under the constitu-
tion; and we apprehend the rule to be that an unconstitutional
and void law may yet be color of authority to support, as against
anybody but the state, a public or private corporation de facto,
where such corporation is of a kind which is recognized by, and
its existence is consistent with, the paramount law, and the gen-
eral system of law in the state."
The cases which have refused to accept the principle that an
unconstitutional statute can be a sufficient color of authority for
54 60 Fed. 55 (C. C. A. 6th, 1893). The court consisted of Taft and
Lurton, circuit judges, and Severens, district judge.
54% Ibid. 64.
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a de facto municipal corporation base their conclusion upon the
strict logical deduction set forth in Justice Field's famous dic-
tun, and fail to recognize that the de facto doctrine is not
founded upon strict legalistic principles, but upon the broad
foundations of public policy. It must be admitted that no cor-
porate entity can spontaneously create itself, that it requires
the exercise of legislative power to give it the breath of life.4
But the legislative fiat may be either express or implied, may be
found in the fundamental law as well as in the act of the legis-
lature or of the local electorate under the home-rule provisions
of the state constitutions. If the state constitution malkes pro-
vision for cities or counties and delegates the power to create
them to the legislature under certain restrictions, the failure
of the latter to comply with the constitutional requirements Nill
not destroy the color of authority given by the fundamental law.
Of course, if there is no such provision in the fundamental law,
from which the court can infer a creation of the corporation in
potentia, if the corporation sought to be created by an invalid
statute is unknown to the constitution or by implication is ex-
cluded because the constitution itself establishes the agency
which is to perform the functions, there can be no basis for the
color of authority requisite to the recognition of a de facto cor-
poration 6
Whether one accepts the broad assumption that an unconstitu-
tional statute, which is the only source of the creative act under
which the corporation derives its powers, is sufficient or the more
logical principle that there must be somewhere a precedent "valid
law," if only in the potential existence recognized by the state
constitution, is often made to depend upon the view one takes of
the effect of the action of our courts in declaring statutes uncon-
stitutional. Z That this question is not necessarily involved in the
determination of a de facto corporate existence should be obvious
when we remember that "color of title" does not mean and never
has meant legal authority, but only the appearance of authority.
An unconstitutional statute, therefore, may be sufficient color of
authority, provided there is somewhere at the same time a war-
s5 See Warren, Collateral Attack on Incrporatic (1907) 20 HEAnv. L.
REv. 456, (1908) 21 ibid. 305.
56 Hildreth v. McIntire, 1 J. 3. Marsh. 206 (Ky. 1829) ; People -. Town
of Nevada, 6 Cal. 143 (1856); Colton v. Rossi, 9 Cal. 595 (1858); Snyder
v. Studebakef, supra, note 34; Att'y Gen. v. Marr, 55 Mich. 445, 21 N. W.
883 (1885); Norton v. Shelby County, supra note 49; Eaton v. Walker
76 Mich. 579, 43 N. W. 638 (1889); City of Guthrie v. Territory, -upra,
note 12; Atchison, T. & S. F. R. R. v. Kearney County, 58 Kan. 19, 48 Pac.
583 (1897).
5 7 For a discussion of this question, see Field, E,fcct of an Unconstitu-
tional Statute (1926) 1 IN D. L. J. 1; Comment (1926) 39 HARV. L. REv. 373.
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rant in law for the creation of the corporate entity which lays
claim to a de facto existence..
Of the leading cases cited to support the view that there can
be no de facto corporation organized under an unconstitutional
statute, it is doubtful if any one of them cannot be supported
upon other grounds. In Brandenstein v. Hoke,"8 in which a writ
of mandate was prayed for to compel the levying of a tax to
meet the principle and interest on bonds issued by3 a levee dis-
trict, the court sustained the plea that the district had no de
facto status because organized under an unconstitutional statute,
but the statute had been declared void by the supreme court V,
prior to the attempted organization, so that plainly it constituted
no sufficient color of authority.
In Atehison, T. & S. F. R. R. v. Kearney County,60 which is
often cited as upholding the view that there can be no de facto
municipal corporation under an unconstitutional statute, the ac-
tion was upon certain warrants issued by the defendant before
it had become organized de jure. The court held that the earlier
statute under which the organization was attempted was void, as
the legislature failed to comply with the mandatory provisions
of the constitution, and that the defect was patent upon the face
of the act itself. That such was the basis of the decision may
be seen by reference to another case, Riley v. Garfield Town-
ship,1 decided at the same term, which held that the defendant,
being organized under an unconstitutional statute before it was
adjudged invalid, was a de facto corporation under the rule
enumerated in State v. Carroll. It is also noteworthy that the
Circuit Court of Appeals refused to follow the decision of the
Supreme Court of Kansas in Atchison, T. & S. F. R. R. v. Kear-
ney County, holding that the constitutional irregularity in, the
enacting clause of the statute was not sufficiently patent to de-
prive the act of color of authority, and that a de facto organiza-
tion of the county was effected thereunder.2
In the two cases entitled Town of Winneconne v. Village of
Winneconne,6 3 decided at the same, term by the Supreme Court
of Wisconsin, the plaintiff sued to recover from the defendant
certain liquor license moneys collected by it during a period when
it was claimed the village had no legal existence because organ-
ized under an unconstitutional statute. In the first case, brought
for moneys collected in 1893, the plea was sustained, the court
58 101 Cal. 131, 35 Pac. 562 (1894).
59 Moulton v. Parks, 64 Cal. 166, 30 Pac. 613 (1883).
60 Supra note 56.
6' 58 Kan. 299, 49 Pac. 85 (1897).
62 Speer v. Board of Commissioners, 88 Fed. 749 (C. C. A. 8th, 1898).
Acord: White v. City of Quanah, 27 S. W. 839 (Tex. Cir. App. 1894).
6 111 Wis. 10, 86 N. W. 589 (1901).
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holding that the curative act of 1897 01 could not validate a cor-
poration void ab initio, and that service upon the village officers
prior to the general validating act was of no effect to give juiis-
diction over the defendant. In the second case brought for
moneys collected in the two subsequent years, in which service
was made after the general validating act, the court allowed re-
covery upon the ground that, by the terms of the validating act,
the condition imposed upon the village the liabilities of its pre-
decessor, denominated as the "pre-existing voluntary organiza-
tion." In McDonald v. Doustr in which also the doctrine of
Norton v. Shelby County is reiterated, the county organization
which the statute attempted to set up was in direct violation of
the express provision of the constitutionco which had established
the counties of the state by recognizing the several counties of
the territory as they existed at the time of its adoption and had
failed to delegate any power to the legislature to establish new
counties.
In the above cases, it appears that the true basis for denying
to the corporation a de facto status lay in the absence of any
legislative act to give vitality to its creation. An examination
of the cases holding, some of them unreservedly, that a de facto
office or municipal corporation can exist under color of an un-
constitutional statute will reveal that in no instance did the in-
valid act give life to the corporation, but that either in other
valid acts or in the constitution itself the office or the corpora-
tion was potentially created. Thus, in St. Louis v. Shields,7
where the question was one of collateral attack, there was not
only recognition in the constitution itself but also by other acts
of the state. In School District No. 25 v. State r, the plea was
made in defense to suit on bonds issued by the district that the
acts creating it were without authority in law and under an un-
constitutional statute changing the county boundaries; but the
court in asserting the de facto character of the defendant relied
upon the general laws of the state relating to the organization
of school districts, which gave it the requisite legislation sanc-
tion. In Burt v. Winona & St. Paid R. R. c3 the constitution
vested the judicial power in a supreme court and such other in-
ferior courts as the legislature from time to time might create
by a two-thirds vote. It was held that a municipal court organ-
ized under a statute invalid for failure to comply with the two-
thirds provision was a de facto court. In Coast Co. v. Spring
-4 Wis. Laws 1897, c. 5.
6511 Idaho 14, 81 Pac. 60 (1905).
66 IDAHO CONsT. Art. XVIII, § 1 (1889).
67Supra note 31.
68 29 Kan. 57 (1882).
69 31 Minn. 472, 18 N. W. 285 (1884).
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Lake 70 it was held in a collateral proceeding that the fact that
the statute under which the defendant borough was organized
had subsequently been declared unconstitutional in another case
did not destroy its de facto status, which would continue until a
judgment of ouster in quo warranto proceedings instituted by
the state was executed. Here again boroughs under the name
of towns were potentially created by the New Jersey constitu-
tion.71 In both Thompson v. Couch 72 and Lang v. Bayonne,"
the offices in question existed by virtue of valid statutes other
than the unconstitutional acts under which the attempt was made
to organize. So, also, in Wendt v. Berry 74 and Ball v. Eady Co.1
the Supreme Court of Kentucky, in holding that certain cities
were de facto of the class under which they purported to operate
by virtue of unconstitutional statutes, pointed out that cities were
potentially created and their classification fixed by section 156
of the Constitution of 1890.70
The principle that color of title under an unconstitutional stat-
ute can exist only where there is some other valid law under
which the organization may be effected, or at least an authority
in potentia by the state constitution, has its counterpart in the
negative propositions that there can be no color of authority in
an unconstitutional statute that plainly so appears on its face
or that attempts to authorize the ousting of a de jure or de facto
municipal corporation upon the same territory; in the one case
the fact would imply the imputation of bad faith, in the other
the new organization must be regarded as a mere usurper. It
is upon this principle that the decision in Norton v. Shelby
County and similar cases should be predicated. An illustration
of the application of the distinction above set forth may be found
in comparing Hildreth v. McIntire 77 with Nagel v. Bosworth,78
both of which involved the de facto character of courts erected
under unconstitutional statutes. In the former case, the legis-
lature of Kentucky sought to abolish the Court of Appeals estab-
lished by the constitution and to create another court of appeals
in lieu of it. It was held that new organizations could not exist
70 56 N. J. Eq. 615, 36 AtI. 21 (1896). To the same effect see: Att'y
Gen. v. Town of Dover, 62 N. J. L. 138, 41 AtI. 98 (1898).
71 N. J. CONsT. Art. I, § 19, Art. IV, § 7 (11) (1897) ; Hermann v. Gut-
tenberg, 63 N. J. L. 616, 44 AtI. 758 (1899).
72 144 Mich. 671, 108 N. W. 363 (1906).
73Supra note 52.
74 154 Ky. 586, 157 S. W. 1115 (1913).
75 193 Ky. 813, 237 S. W. 670 (1922).
76 See, also, in accord: State v. Gardner, 54 Ohio St. 24, 42 N. E. 999
(1896) (opinion by Spear, J.) and cases cited therein; Speer v. Board of
Commissioners, supra note 62.
77 Supra note 56.
7S 148 Ky. 807, 147 S. W. 940 (1912).'
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de facto, as a court of appeals de jure was in existence and the
act of the legislature was ultra vires and palpably in violation
of the constitution. In the second case, however, which held
that a circuit court organized under an unconstitutional statute
had a de facto existence, it was pointed out that circuit courts
were not directly created but were recognized by the constitu-
tion7 9 which expressly provided that a circuit court shall be es-
tablished in each county of the state.
As a result of this analysis of the cases the following prin-
ciples may be deduced which seem to reconcile the apparently
conflicting decisions:
I. The color of authority requisite to the organization of a
de facto municipal corporation may be:
1. A valid law enacted by the legislature.
2. An unconstitutional law, valid on its face, which has either
(a) been upheld for a time by the courts or (b) not yet been
declared void; provided that a warrant for its creation can be
found in some other valid law or in the recognition of its poten-
tial existence by the general laws or constitution of the state.
II. There can be no de facto municipal corporation unless,
either directly or potentially, such a de jure corporation is au-
thorized by some legislative fiat.
III. There can be no color of authority in an unconstitutional
statute alone, the invalidity of which is apparent on its face.
IV. There can be no de facto corporation created to take the
place of an existing de jure corporation, as such an organization
would clearly be an usurper.
It is submitted that the principles thus formulated are com-
prehensive enough to cover all the cases in which the issue of
the de facto status of a municipal corporation has been brought
in issue. Even the broad assertion often made that an uncon-
stitutional statute is in all cases sufficient color of authority, as
in the opinion of the court in Albuquerque v. Watcr Supply Com-
pany,8 ° will be found upon examination to be subject to the limi-
tations above set forth.
To the objection that the principles here invoked do not meet
the conflict in the views expressed by the courts in these differ-
ent cases, the answer must be frandy made that the opinions
themselves are irreconcilable. To the more serious objection
that they will not explain satisfactorily the numerous cases in
which the state itself is precluded from ousting an irregular
municipal corporation by quo warranto, because of what is in-
discriminately called its acquiescence or laches or estoppel, 8' the
79 Ky. CoNsT. § 125 (1891).
$o 24 N. M. 368, 174 Pac. 217 (1918). See recognition of cities in N. 3.
Co7,sT. Art. IV, § 24, Art. X, §§ 12, 13 (1911).
f Jameson v. People, supra note 21; People v. Maynard, supr note 27;
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reply must be that the so-called estoppel of the state to question
the right of a municipality to corporate existence is based upon
an entirely different principle which does not necessarily involve
any consideration of the de facto doctrine. This question, as
well as that of the relation of the de facto status to the doctrines
of collateral attack and of equitable estoppel, requires a separate
treatinent for any adequate or satisfactory discussion.
State v. Leatherman, supra note 13; State v. Des Moines, 96 Iowa 521, 65
N. W. 818 (1896) ; McCain v. Des Moines, 174 U. S. 168, 19 Sup. Ct. 644
(1899); State v. McLean County, 11 N. D. 356, 92 N. W. 385 (1902);
Soule v. People, 205 IIl. 618, 69 N. E. 22 (1903) ; People v. Alturas County,
6 Idaho 418, 55 Pac. 1067 (1889); Att'y Gen. v. Methuen, 236 Mass. 564,
129 N. E. 662 (1921).
